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Although an extensive amount of literature reviews emerging patterns of
east-west co-operation, it is not easy to grasp the state of the art. Too
many of the books, articles and papers tend to mark the trees rather
than to map the forest.
The paper analyses recent trends from the point of view of modern eco-
nomics which emphasizes the growing use of a wide variety of new
types of co-operative mechanisms between firms in organizing interna-
tional business. It takes an appraising look at the outcome of a recent
research project of a group of scholars from east and west.
The paper comes to the conclusion that east-west integration is pro-
ceeding at a considerable rate. But it is dominated by shallow modes —
by arm's length transactions and contract work. To a certain extent, this
might reflect new patterns of inter-firm co-operation. But this might also
be an indication that co-operation with partners in CECTs is still in a flat
state. Eastern firms find it hard to obtain an adequate position in inter-
national networks. Their lack of competence, reliability and reputation is
often an insurmountable barrier. Accordingly, they must improve upon
their technological and organizational standards to be considered by
western firms as competent, reliable and trustworthy and, hence, equal
partners in collaborational networks (D2, 8; F02, 1, 2, 14, 15, 23).Introduction
There is a rich and valuable body of literature on the Central European
countries' in transition (CECTs) re-integration into the world economy. It
emphasizes
• the massive geographic trade re-orientation towards western, es-
pecially EU-markets,
• the moderate commodity specialization, in particular the increase in
intra-industry trade and the decrease in the strong comparative bias
against skill-intensive industries, and
• the incipient integration of eastern firms into international production
networks.
The message seems to be clear: east-west co-operation is progressing
— but along distinctly multispeed routes.
Looking down from the mountains of books, articles and papers, though,
nobody can be satisfied. Too many publications suffer from a serious
shortcoming: they tend to mark the trees rather than to map the forest —
in other words, they fail to scrutinize facts and figures in depth within the
context of modern economics. As it is all too often the case that re-
searchers still find themselves in a position of playing theoretical catch-
up. Frequently, they still tend to examine available evidence on the issue
Research for this paper was undertaken with support from the European Commis-
sion's Phare ACE Programme 1996, project no. 96-2003-R. An earlier version was
presented on a workshop held in Prague from 17-19 April 1998. I am grateful to
the participants of the workshop for their helpful comments and to Wolfgang
Winkler for linguistic improvements.from the analytical perspective of traditional trade theory which gener-
ates a story about unrelated firms, competing in international markets by
exploiting local advantages in terms of different factor endowments. This
approach, however, underscores the growing use of a wide variety of
new types of co-operative mechanisms between firms in organizing inter-
national business.
There is a general lesson to be learnt: the advance of the global busi-
ness has generated the intensification of inter-firm co-operation. In order
to cope with global competition, firms find it increasingly hard to pursue a
stand-alone strategy. They try to integrate themselves into a complex
international corporate system in the form of vertically and horizontally
organized networks.
There is a substantial amount of evidence that firms in CECTs have diffi-
culties getting access to networks of western multinationals. At best,
they can obtain a subordinate position because organizers of networks
tend to favour firms with provable competence, reliability and reputation.
Even a low cost advantage will not necessarily open the door to them.
Businessmen and policy makers in CECTs tend to complain about this.
However, they often have only vague ideas of what really matters in or-
der to create synergies and to realize economies of scope. It is the ob-
jective of this paper to sketch a framework for a better understanding of
the network approach.
The paper is organized as follows: it
• first, sketches the basic theoretical assumptions of the network ap-
proach,
• second, reviews the state of the art of east-west co-operation,• third, reveals the incentives for co-operating firms,
• fourth, lists the main obstacles to finding access to collaborative
networks, and
• fifth, discusses some policy conclusions.
The paper is the outcome of many years of intensive co-operation of a
group of researchers from several European countries within the frame-
work of the European Commission's ACE-Phare Programme. Starting in
the summer of 1992, the group has extensively examined the process of
the integration of firms in CECTs into European trade flows and co-
operation schemes and has accordingly accumulated a substantial stock
of information. Thus, the paper has many contributors, namely all mem-
bers of the group.
2
Nevertheless, the paper does not necessarily reflect consensus of opin-
ion on all aspects of the research issue. It rather presents the highly per-
sonalized account of the group's research.
I New Trends in Network Operations
It is advisable to start the paper with a look at recent trends in business
organization which has undergone massive transformation. In response
to the rapidly changing environment, firms have been, in particular,
The group comprised the following members: Prof. Benjamin Bastida and Prof.
Tereza Virgili, Universidad de Barcelona; Prof. Bruno Dallago, Universita degli
Studi di Trento; Katja Gerling, Kiel Institute of World Economics; Dr. Maciej
Grabowski, The Gdansk Institute of Market Economics; Prof. Judit Hamar, Kopint-
Datorg, Budapest; Dr. Gabor Papanek, GKI Economic Research Institute, Buda-
pest; Dr. Romulus Palade, National Bank of Romania; Dr. Julie Pellegrin, Univer-
sity of Birmingham; Dr. Jana Sereghyova, Economics Institute, Prague (co-ordina-
tor).• moving from Fordist, mass production patterns to flexible, small lot
sizes and short run production;
• buying rather than making parts of their inputs and reducing the
number of suppliers dealt with directly;
• switching from short-term contracting to long-term interacting en-
hancing the partners' ability to commit themselves credibly; and
• overcoming uniform organizational modes by shaping specific, tai-
lor-made strategies.
3
Changes in business organization are not a novelty. Firms have always
reorganized themselves as well as their relationships to others. Over
time, new organizational modes have emerged, though gradually rather
than eruptively. In recent years, however, firms have started to reorgan-
ize their organizational structures in a fundamental way — optimizing all
parts of their value chain with respect to production, sourcing, trading,
research and development, investment and financing, information flows,
logistics and administration. In particular, they have been breaking down
the value chain into discrete functions and shifting parts of it to locations
where they can be carried out most profitably. And they have been build-
ing up a sophisticated business infrastructure across the value chain for
safeguarding good product quality, reliable delivery times, post-sales
activities, and unhindered information flows.
For a discussion of the recent literature about business organization see Siebert
[1995].Changes in Business Organization
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Source: Milgrom and Roberts [1995].
The new features observed have important implications for inter-firm
co-ordination [Casson 1985; Blaine 1994]:
• First, with more supply purchased outside (which was formerly pro-
duced inside) the trend is towards greater use of market transac-
tions. In terms of traditional theory, co-ordination via internal hierar-
chy is tentatively being replaced by market transactions.
• Second, with integrated production networks (which are substituting
arm's-length deals made by separate firms) the trend is towards
close inter-firm transactions. Whereas in markets, co-ordination iseffected by prices and in hierarchies by control, in networks it is ef-
fected by a wide range of contractual and co-operative mechanisms.
Although a comprehensive theory of new forms of business organization,
in particular with regard to inter-firm co-operation, has not been devel-
oped, this is no disadvantage. Like a tree with many branches, there are
many schools which made important contributions to explaining the
wide-spread use of the new co-operative mechanisms. In a short intro-
duction, focusing on the transaction cost theory, the interorganizational
theory and the strategic management theory [Gerling 1997], we provide
some cornerstones of the new network approach [Schmidt 1997c].
1 Networks and Transaction Costs
Perhaps the most important contribution to modern business organiza-
tion theory has come from the New Institutional Economics (NIE). While
standard microeconomic theory focuses on a "frictionless world" (with
zero transaction costs, hence perfect markets), a more realistic view re-
quires consideration of such issues as asymmetric information, uncer-
tainty and opportunism. The question to be answered is: why do eco-
nomic actors organize their business neither in external markets nor in
internal hierarchies but in intermediated form such as collaborative net-
works?
The focal point of NIE is the study of a "contract" which is the core of a
network. For that, NIE provides a set of "tools" not available in the ortho-
dox production and market theory [Furubotn and Richter 1991; Richter
1996]. The most important ones are:
• Transaction costs which can be described as the costs of conclud-
ing, monitoring and enforcing the performance of a contract. The
central idea here is that specific institutional arrangements such as
co-operating in a network can reduce transaction costs and can
thus be efficient in terms of resource allocation.
• Property rights which authorize the recipient to proper enforcement
of the contract. The point is that organizations cannot only be con-
sidered as rational entities formed by deliberate actions but mustalso be seen as the outcome of a certain distribution of power
among economic actors co-operating within an accepted set of
rules.
• Principal-agent relations which clarify the responsibilities in co-ope-
rations under conditions of asymmetric information (bounded ra-
tionality) among contracting parties. They also deal with the possi-
bility of opportunistic behaviour of one party.
• Incomplete or relational contracts which make allowance for the fact
that it is ex ante not possible to contract for all unforeseeable even-
tualities which may arise in the future.
• Self-enforcement which directs attention to the fact that not all busi-
ness relations (e.g. binding customers to trademarks) can be safe-
guarded by contractual obligations. In this case, both partners have
to do their best with respect to their reputation.
From the standpoint of NIE, network co-operation can be efficient if, by
taking account of the above, transaction costs can be reduced, compe-
tence can be increased, uncertainty can be limited, and hence allocation
of resources can be optimized.
Once again: co-operation within a network should be understood in
terms of NIE as a special form of co-ordination — located between the
market place and a hierarchical organization of a single firm. Instead of
opportunism (dominating market transactions) and control (dominating
hierarchical organizations), networks are governed to a great extent by
contractual and collaborative arrangements based on reputation. This
means that parties in a network refrain from cheating and fully honour
their obligations.
2 Networks and Resource Dependencies
While NIE views networks as a response to general market imperfec-
tions which need specific contractual arrangements, interorganizational
theories (IT) consider them somewhat differently: as response to a spe-
cific problem, namely the changing and hence unstable environmental
conditions. IT suggest a causal link between firms' performance, their
organizational structure and the environment in which they operate. A
central issue is the importance of external dependencies on resources
which might be essential for firms' survival [Hakansson 1987; Johanson
and Mattson 1991].8
One basic argument of this approach is that co-ordination takes place
through interaction of firms in a network in which prices or costs are but
one of several influencing conditions. This view is consistent with the cri-
tique of transaction cost economics which focuses on the marginal cost
principle in explaining the firms' strategic behaviour between markets
and hierarchies.
Inter-organizational theories are seen as a combination of three integral
parts:
• Resources which include e.g. raw materials, technology, human and
financial capital and information. In order to get access to re-
sources, firms engage in relations with other firms managing their
mutual dependencies in a way that guarantees their survival.
• Actors who are a sample of firms which are able and willing to form
stable and interdependent relations.
• "Activities which are performed by the actors not in an isolated way
but via activity chains.
Interaction within networks takes the form of exchange relations which
co-ordinate resources and activities among actors in an efficient way. By
that, it is hoped to achieve an economic advantage over competitors that
is higher than in markets and hierarchies.
Like NIE relationships (which use the term reputation), IT relationships
are based on a degree of trust. Trust is important as it enables to cope
with uncertainty. In conceptualizing trust, one can distinguish four di-
mensions, namely
• competence which refers to the actors' technical capability,
• openness which refers to the actors' willingness to provide and
share information,
• caring which refers to the actors' expectation that one actor will not
exploit the others, and
• reliability which refers to the actors' predictability [Mishra 1993, cited
from Kumar 1996].
Trust implies a cognitive and an affective dimension so that it is useful to
differentiate between familiarity and liking. The concept can become
crucial in many cases, in particular if partners do not like each other.
Consequently, cultural factors can and do influence the partners' deci-sion to form a network as an alternative to using external markets or in-
ternal structures.
As trust is a sort of capital which has to be accumulated over time, a
network can take long to develop. Usually, it evolves in a slow process,
starting with minor transactions in which little trust is required because
little risk is involved. Sometimes, it remains restricted to a "flat state" —
due to the absence of mutual trust. Consequently, there is a multiplicity
of collaborative ventures between firms.
3 Balancing Co-operation and Competition within Networks
The crucial issue in networks is to find the balance between co-operation
and competition. Independent firms, which are competitors in special
markets, might co-operate in special fields, e.g. in research activities in
order to pool their resources and to reduce costs and risks.
The conditions to which competing and co-operating firms underlie are
the subject of the Strategic Management Theory (SMT). SMT explains
how competing firms can shape a strategic partnership — and how to
manage the difficulties it involves. According to Ajami [1989], a strategic
partnership requires the following elements in order to succeed:
• Shared goals and objectives which implies that firms must agree on
a clearly defined and workable business strategy.
• Coupling of chances and risks which implies a fair distribution of
gains and losses.
• Flexibility which implies the creation of new routines with respect to
research, production and distribution.
• Clearly defined boundaries which implies accepting and respecting
the independency and the responsibility of the partners when com-
peting in markets excluded from partnership.
• Shared understanding and agreement concerning mechanisms
which implies, besides some contractual arrangements, a strong
element of trust.
It is important to mention that strategic alliances are an arrangement
suitable for horizontal integration rather than for vertical integration. They
are not intended for "eternity", but frequently have a short lifespan.10
To claim that inter-firm relationships are "networked" does not imply that
they are uniform in shape. It would also be misleading to
ssay that all
firms follow the same "paradigm path". In reality, we find a broad variety
of network relations, e.g. offshore processing, licensing, franchising,
strategic alliances, which can be explained in different ways depending
on firms' economic and technological environment. As a rough guideline,
Nunnenkamp, Gundlach and Agarwal [1994] suggested distinguishing
three categories of industries with different co-ordination mechanisms:
• For highly complex production processes where network relations
involve information, intangible assets or R&D-intensive goods and
services, a hierarchical control on the basis of an equity arrange-
ment and hence a high share of intra-firm transactions are likely to
occur.
• For less complex production processes the mechanisms of co-ope-
ration are principally open and hence a high share of both intra-firm
and arm's-length transactions is possible.
• For production processes involving standardized goods a non-eq-
uity, contractual form of co-operation can be expected. The resulting
transactions are more likely of an inter-firm than an intra-firm type.
From this, one can derive that deep or complex integration strategies are
mainly adopted in knowledge-intensive industries like chemicals, me-
chanical engineering, electrical engineering, electronics and transport
equipment, whereas shallow or simple integration strategies are pre-
ferred in capital- and labour-intensive industries like wood, pulp and pa-
per, glass and pottery, and textile and clothing.11
The implications are hard: they suggest that it is difficult, in particular for
knowledge-intensive firms, to find access to networks. For many firms in
CECTs, it is presently still out of the scope. They have neither the com-
petence nor the reputation to overcome the impediments to close co-op-
eration. They are not able, e.g., to guarantee required product qualities
and just-in-time delivery, to undertake specific investments in machinery
and skills, or to conclude a long-term fixed price contract (which pushes
all the risk of an unforeseeable cost increase on to them). Accordingly,
they are not regarded as reliable partners by western firms.
Frequently, firms in CECTs fail to understand that the network approach
implies completely new, radical ways of organizing sourcing and store-
keeping, production and quality control, research and development,
transport and deliveries, marketing and post-sales activities — and that
these changes also imply important alterations in the nature and forms of
relationships between firms.
II Extent and Forms of East-West Network Operations
New organizational theories suggest that changes in the environment
are crucial components in understanding recent trends in inter-firm co-
operation. The basic message is that in establishing collaborative net-
works, firms follow different routes and progress at different speed — in
accordance with political, institutional, economic and technological cir-
cumstances.
1 Economic and Political Integration
In models of international trade theory, economic factors clearly deter-
mine the route and speed of integration: markets are considered fully12
integrated when goods and factor flows across borders are not restricted
by political boundaries and, hence, firms on both sides of the border can
completely exploit their competitive advantages.
International economic integration, however, is seldom purely "market
driven". It often follows routes designed by economic policy. Not surpris-
ingly, the CECTs
1 integration process appears to be somewhat westward
biased — in anticipation of full membership of the EU. For most busi-
nessmen, economists and policy makers in CECTs, international eco-
nomic integration has become synonymous with EU-integration. There-
fore, the ongoing east-west integration widely differs from integration in
other parts of the world which followed economic rather than political
routes [Agarwal et al. 1995]. It is debatable at least whether firms in
CECTs are well advised to concentrate all their efforts on co-operation
with partners in the east — and neglect co-operation with traditional
partners in the west. Despite political rhetorics, there is only a slow train
towards the EU full membership, and only a few countries are already
sitting in it [Schmidt 1997a].
One might argue that the pronounced westward orientation is a "must"
for firms in CECTs: given the enormous technological gap, it is the only
route towards restoring their competitiveness. The crucial point is, how-
ever, that the EU's admission strategy of "hub and spoke bilateralism",
which links each candidate for full membership as a separate "spoke" to
the west European "hub", tends to marginalize the majority of transfor-
mation countries politically and economically by favouring western in-
vestment in some "spoke countries" [Baldwin 1994]. Actually, western
foreign direct investment (FDI) is extremely unevenly distributed: the
lion's share is concentrated in only four countries, in the Czech Republic,
in Hungary, in Poland and in Slovenia, which are the most successfulfeifi) 13
candidates [Hunya 1996]. So far, the EU's admission strategy has be-
come a springboard for these countries, while for others it has become a
barrier.
2 Deep and Shallow Co-operation
CECTs
1 achievements in westward-integration are impressive by any
standards, but they should not be overrated: until now, they have mainly
taken the form of trade re-orientation, interlinked with mainly shallow
forms of foreign engagements, such as offshore processing, franchising
and licensing — the process of becoming deeply involved in interna-
tionally integrated production networks has proceeded more slowly. So
far, CECTs still have a long way to go until they reach full international
integration.
The implementation of east-west co-operative networks — their extent
and forms, success and failures, gains and losses — was studied inten-
sively. The picture appears to be very multi-coloured, reflecting different
firm strategies depending on the type of production, company size, cor-
porate structure and, last but not least, competence. Pellegrin [1997a]
suggests distinguishing four criteria for characterizing networks: the
forms of organizing the value chain (horizontal or vertical), the extent of
recourse to local suppliers (strong or weak), the relations with partners
(merchant or captive) and the regional scope of transactions (bilateral or
regional). As a rule, western firms have mainly
• built up vertical relationships: local firms have been mostly suppliers
of materials and components, assemblers or refiners.14
• delegated subordinated tasks: local firms have been commissioned
with labour-intensive, low value added operations, while headquar-
ter functions and high value added activities have remained at
home.
• established minority equity joint ventures or subcontractual relation-
ships with a low degree of commitment: by that, local firms have be-
come economically dependent on their foreign partners rather than
legally dependent.
• concentrated their activities on supplying certain markets, in particu-
lar on supplying host country markets: local partners have neverthe-
less been used as bridgeheads for serving other markets.
In most cases, east-west collaborative networks have started with shal-
low forms of mutual integration, since the capacity of firms in CECTs to
become competent, reliable and reputable partners has been very lim-
ited: product quality and delivery punctuality have been low, specializa-
tion has been poor and co-ordination of activities has been difficult. Con-
sequently, many western multinationals have considered the establish-
ment of strong linkages with a foreign subsidiary as too risky. Therefore,
they have performed a strategy of "testing the water" first but they have
not been "in a hurry to jump".
It is understandable that economists, businessmen and policy makers in
CECTs are not happy with this state of affairs. They bridle at western
firms what they call "downgrading" of local producers to "third-tier" sub-
contractors — representing the "most simple" and "underdemanding"
type of commission work [Sereghyova 1997b,c]. However, they often fail
to notice that network production is decisively governed by the partners'15
competence, reliability and reputation. Sometimes, a network remains
restricted to a flat state — due to the absence of these factors. In this
case simple commission work might protect firms at least from bank-
ruptcy. For unviable firms it might be also a vehicle to a well-ordered exit
[Balcerowicz et al. 1996].
In a dynamic perspective, the prospect looks somewhat brighter: empiri-
cal evidence suggests that successful subcontracting relations will be
sooner or later gradually upgraded — to more balanced forms of part-
nership [Pellegrin 1997b, c]. Frequently, for instance, outsourced stages
of the production process may become more sophisticated over time.
There is an impressive example: the progressing move of the manufac-
turing of men's jackets, one of the most complex clothing operations,
from western countries to CECTs. It illustrates that subcontractors are
seen as pivotal in the supply also of complex and high quality products
[Graziani 1996].
There are good reasons to judge the role of western firms for the re-
structuring process in CECTs positively. Generally, foreign-owned or
foreign-managed firms outperform domestic firms clearly — e.g., by
larger investments, easier access to foreign commodity and financial
markets, better logistics and organization and, as a result, higher profits
[Halpern and Korosi 1997; Zemplinerova 1997]. In particular, foreign-
owned or -managed firms are more export-oriented [Grabowski 1997;
Hamar 1997a,b]. Needless to say that not all the hopes of eastern firms
have been fulfilled so far [Papanek 1997; Sereghyova 1997c]. However,
often these hopes have been too over-ambitious.16
3 Equity-Based and Contractual Relationships
Firms have a degree of choice of how to organize their relationships with
partners — ranging from simple arm's-length transactions among legally
independent firms to fully integrated production lines under the strict
governance of a parent company. Deep co-operation is usually associ-
ated with equity links. Accordingly, many researchers have focused on
this type [Naujoks and Schmidt 1995; Hunya 1996; Nesvera1997]. They
have traced a clear pattern: foreign ownership is relatively high
• in technology-intensive industries, not in those producing standard-
ized labour-intensive goods,
• in industries with a great market potential and not in those facing
shrinking markets, and
• in industries dominated by large "healthy" firms and not in those
dominated by ailing firms.
Main industries with above-average shares of foreign capital participa-
tion are motor vehicles and transport equipment, machinery and electri-
cal equipment, food, beverages and tobacco, paper, publishing and
printing. Co-operation in these industries might require an equity control
over partners in order to overcome, e.g., deficient property rights, quality
and delivery uncertainties and imperfect information flows.
However, many operations in networks are facilitated by weaker and
simpler forms of integration, in particular by contract work outside inter-
nal hierarchies. By contract work, the subcontractor is integrated into a
value adding chain by functional linkages rather than by equity. Rela-
tively low shares of foreign ownership have been observed in mining, in17
iron and steel, in chemicals and in metal industries as well as in furni-
ture, in textiles, in apparel and in leather which are usually highly inte-
grated in international networks by offshore processing trade (OPT).
All in all, there is ample evidence that east-west network operations fre-
quently take intermediate forms representing a relatively flat state of
co-operation. Dominating are OPT and other types of contract work
[Hamar 1997a,b; Sereghyova 1997b,c; Pellegrin 1997c; Papanek 1997],
which do not require equity links between partners. In the typical case,
the western contractor provides input mainly in the form of materials and
technological assistance, i.e. machinery and know-how, to the eastern
sub-contractor. This makes sense. Often, an equity involvement might
be considered by him as too risky. It might also absorb too much of his
management capacity, usually the shortest factor in western firms. A full
or a majority ownership is only necessary if the contractor has a strong
interest in keeping the subcontractor on a short lead.
For several reasons, firms in CECTs are extremely suitable candidates
for OPT [Naujoks and Schmidt 1994]:
• They can offer low wage rates for unqualified as well as for skilled
labour, combined with relatively high labour productivity. This consti-
tutes an important source of comparative advantages for sub-con-
tractors in so-called Heckscher-Ohlin industries.
• They operate geographically close to manufacturing centres in
western Europe. The modern production concepts of western firms
(such as just-in-time delivery or consumer-response delivery) favour
geographic proximity between producers and their foreign offshore
plants as they require fast and reliable transport.18
• They have competitive advantages in the production of so-called
"sensible goods" which are subject to trade barriers upheld by the
EU: exports and imports of OPT are, as a matter of principle, duty-
free since only the added value has to be declared.
4 Producer-Led and Retailer-Led Networks
Traditionally, networks among firms are producer-led, that is large-scale
manufacturers organize sourcing production, storage, transport, distribu-
tion and after-sales service. However, their influence has been weaken-
ing all over the world. Large-scale retailers operating chains of depart-
ment stores and supermarkets have been drastically re-organizing their
sales routes. As a result, they have been gaining the leadership in net-
works — controlling prices, quality, assortment lot, and delivery times. In
dealing with producers, they have come into a strong, frequently even
into a superior position. Basically, they can rigorously select with whom
they do business.
In recent years, more and more western retailers have started to expand
their business including their sophisticated sourcing system eastwards,
too. For local producers in CECTs, this is a chance as well as a threat. It
is a chance if they are able to meet the demand of their counterpart, but
it is a threat if they fail. Experience has shown that it is difficult, but not
impossible even for small-sized producers in CECTs to form close and
stable ties with them. A striking example for a successful network be-
tween foreign retailers and domestic producers is the engagement of the
international furniture chain IKEA in Poland: IKEA holds roughly 150
Polish firms under contract which generate 15 percent of IKEA's world-
wide added value [Grabowski 1997].19
5 Networks between Neighbouring and Distant Regions
As far as cross-border co-operation is based on different factor endow-
ment and factor prices, economic theory suggests that it should start in
neighbouring regions where not only transport costs but also transaction
costs are lower than in distant regions. For example, short distances
make frequent face-to-face contacts possible, thus helping to generate
an atmosphere of trust and control which is essential in a network. There
is empirical evidence all over the world that border regions can become
an economic power-house by economic integration [Sander 1997;
Schmidt 1997b]. However, this is not a self-propelling process. There is
also evidence that great development differences can be a constraint to
rather than an impetus to integration.
Statistical information on cross-border activities along the former Iron
Curtain is rare. The indicator most frequently used is regional distribution
of FDI in CECTs. This indicator suggests that western firms tend to in-
vest mainly in agglomeration areas (in particular in the capital of the
country and its surroundings). In recent years, however, they have in-
creasingly invested also in the border belt, in particular in Poland in the
Szczecin and Zielona Gora regions, in the Czech Republic in the Tachov
region, in Slovakia in the Bratislava region and in Hungary in the Gyor-
Moson-Sopron region. Nesvera [1997] observed a pronounced westward
move of economic activities in the Czech Republic. Nevertheless, FDI
figures should be interpreted with some caution. Geographic distribution
of FDI can be heavily influenced by engagement of a few large multina-
tionals. The figures are not necessarily a proof for a fast integration in
the border belt, in particular for close transboundary co-operations of
small- and medium-sized firms [Gerling and Schmidt 1998].20
III Incentive Issues of East-West Network Operations
Much has been written about firms' objectives of investing abroad. Gen-
erally, the following reasons appear to be the most relevant [Lall 1978]:
• Marketing requirements: the need of getting access to markets; the
need of controlling distribution facilities; the need of a great deal of
specialized after-sales services, of maintaining and updating; the
need of transferring information to and from consumers; and the
need of keeping direct representation to governments in order to in-
fluence politics or to win large orders.
• Exploiting cheap labour, the need of relocating parts of the produc-
tion to low-wage countries in order to cut costs.
• Specificity of the product the need of safeguarding uniqueness,
high quality standards and suitability to given requirements.
• Risk and uncertainty, the need of avoiding disruptions in production,
quality changes and other events which may influence sources of
supply as prices change.
• Unexploited capacity and scale economies: the need of exhausting
own facilities by supplying related affiliates rather than going to open
markets.
• Transfer pricing: the desire to evade high tax rates or to remit prof-
its.
• Government policy in home and in host countries: the need of over-
coming trade barriers such as tariffs, quotas or local content regula-
tions.21
However, this taxonomy accounts mainly for circumstances under which
firms prefer a hierarchical control over the foreign partner by an equity
involvement. It cannot sufficiently explain the proliferation of a network
without or with only little FDI. To call into mind: co-operation in networks
allows firms to manage a wide range of international activities through
contractual rather than equity means.
In the following the focus is directed on four main strategic objectives for
networking firms: increasing competence, reducing transaction costs,
balancing common and diverging interests, and pooling and delegating
risks. Their importance may vary from one case to the other. An eastern
firm, e.g., might put significantly more emphasis on increasing its tech-
nological competence, while a western firm might be more interested in
reducing transaction costs or pooling risks.
1 Increasing Competence
Firms forming a network aim to obtain competitive advantages by ex-
ploiting synergies through partnership. In a network, each partner prin-
cipally benefits from other partners' strengths. This does not mean that
benefits are always equally distributed. In networks partners are neces-
sarily ranked in different positions according to their professional compe-
tence and economic power.
Basically, researchers who examined the state of the art of east-west
co-operation tend to classify it as a valuable tool for upgrading compe-
tence. They find that the majority of firms under investigation has in-
creased engineering capacity and productivity, product design and qual-
ity, delivery reliability and flexibility, brand image and firm reputation, fi-
nancial capability, and, as a result, profitability. However, some re-22
searchers counter that many firms have been degraded to "sub-ordi-
nates" —
• carrying out the most simple tasks as "second-tier" or "third-tier"
sub-contractor far below their technological capabilities,
• bearing higher risks than usually inherent in co-operating,
• obtaining prices and making profits much lower than normal.
They quibble that these firms have become an object for destroying
rather than for building up competence [Sereghyova 1997a,b].
Critics raise a crucial problem. The unequal distribution of competence
and power might lead to opportunistic behaviour of one partner on the
costs of the others. Opportunistic behaviour cannot be completely ex-
cluded by a contract. In the end, co-operation within a network must rely
on trust and fairness rather than on legal enforcement. Not surprisingly,
many east-west business ventures are instable and fail. There is, how-
ever, no evidence that these relationships are more instable than those
between firms located in western industrialized countries and partners in
developing countries where failure rates of 30-65 percent have been re-
ported [Beamish 1987].
2 Reducing Transaction Costs
Another motive for establishing a network type of organization is to cope
with high transaction costs in complex production lines and markets.
Traditionally, it had been hoped to solve this problem by centralized de-
cision making within hierarchically structured organizations. However,
centralization of control and co-ordination had often proved to be an in-
flexible and, hence, inefficient mode. The dramatic decline in information23
and communication costs made contractual and collaborative agree-
ments between firms an attractive alternative to equity control.
For many western firms, the CECTs are still a terra incognita — the
search for a competent and reliable partner looks like a gamble. In such
a situation, they must have a strong preference for stable collaborative
relationships. A hire and fire strategy would be dangerous because it
generates high search and exit costs. There is some empirical evidence
that western firms prefer long-term relationships with partners in CECTs.
They usually start with a flat venture in order to test the opportunities and
the risks. But later on, they deepen it step by step. Permanent not vola-
tile subcontracting is the predominant form of co-operation between for-
eign and local firms in CECTs [Grabowski 1997; Pellegrin 1997]. Stable
and long-term relationships have an important advantage. They can limit
or reduce transaction costs. Important factors in this context are frequent
and intensive communication between all partners, significant invest-
ments by and management transfers from the western partners, and
specific practices that build up mutual trust. Recent case studies by
Dallago [1997], Papanek [1997] and Pellegrin [1997] provide ample em-
pirical evidence that joint ventures between western and eastern firms
performed along these lines have been very successful.
In this respect, the transaction costs approach seems to be a robust tool
for explaining network operations — even when partners prefer contrac-
tual arrangements rather than equity control. For firms in CECTs, low
transaction costs may become an asset when their advantage of low la-
bour costs disappears in the years to come.24
3 Balancing Common and Diverging Interests
In principle, firms co-operating in networks have common interests.
However, they are often factual or potential competitors, too. Co-opera-
tion does not exclude competition, but at least gradually restricts it. Fre-
quently, firms co-operate only in certain fields while in others they com-
pete. Inevitably, they might run into conflicts when marking out demarca-
tion lines. Collusions between producers linked in a network are a prob-
lem around the world.
As a rule, eastern firms are integrated as sub-contractors in vertically
structured networks conducted by western firms. The share of contract
work in total added values differs by type of industry and firm size; it is
the largest in textiles and clothing for small- and medium-sized firms
[Papanek 1997]. Basically, firms linked upstream in a network do not
compete. However, they might hope to climb up the ladder at the ex-
pense of other partners. In essence, they are potential competitors, too.
In contrast to a hierarchical organization, where ownership matters and
where usually only one partner makes decisions, the use of contractual
arrangements provides some degree of freedom for all partners, includ-
ing the exit option. This makes sub-contracting attractive for those firms
which attach importance to their independency but do not want to follow
a stand-alone strategy.
4 Pooling and Delegating Risks
Finally, firms organize their business in networks in order to delegate
risks. In retailer-producer networks, e.g., retailers tend to use producers
as buffers against unexpected fluctuations in consumer demand. In es-
sence, they hold only small inventories — trusting that an ordered article25
can be immediately delivered. Because of short distances to western
markets, firms in CECTs might gain from competitive advantage against
their main competitors in South-East Asia — provided they are able to
adequately accommodate the orders of retailers.
In recent years, however, producers have started to re-organize their
outsourcing chain by drastically reducing the number of suppliers. In this
way, they hope not only to bring down transaction costs but also to pool
risks: they tend to delegate most of the sourcing activities to a few
so-called system-suppliers which operate at their own risk. In building up
supply networks in CECTs, large western multinationals have often
pulled their traditional main suppliers behind them. As a result, many lo-
cal firms in CECTs have considered themselves as "downgraded" to the
position of sub-ordinates. However, western firms have no choice. In or-
der to promote comprehensive restructuring throughout the entire value
chain, the know-how and experience of a proven system supplier are in-
dispensable [Sander 1994]. In addition, there is nothing much to worry
about: local suppliers are offered a "free-ride" on the learning curve. In
this context, mention should be made that many western firms have now
started to contract out sophisticated activities, including research and
development, and to place them within their supplier park. This has in-
creased opportunities for local firms to catch up, too. Once again: for
most firms in CECTs the possibility of climbing up the ladder lies within
the networks of western multinationals and not outside of them [Bellak
1997].
IV Obstacles to East-West Network Operations
Firms in CECTs are undoubtedly latecomers in the process of interna-
tionalization. In many ways, our appraisal provides evidence that there26
are still many obstacles to closer east-west economic co-operation.
These obstacles can be divided into three main categories: first, market
and policy failures, second, management failures and third, different cor-
porate cultures.
1 Deficiencies in Shaping Workable Market Conditions
In a well-working market economy, firms are expected to become opti-
mally linked into the international division of labour by developing an
adequate degree and adequate modes of cross-border operations in ac-
cordance with their competitive advantages. However, as a matter of
fact, the markets in CECTs are still in a rudimentary state. In such cir-
cumstances it is questionable whether firms can respond quickly and ef-
ficiently in order to facilitate their restructuring and reorganization.
Most deficiencies identified in east-west network operations have to do
with deficiencies in shaping workable market conditions. This is the case
if governments impose or fail to remove
• restrictions on trade and investments,
• regulations in commodity and financial markets,
• exchange rate controls,
• excessive tax rates and double taxation,
• public or publicly tolerated private monopolies.
Evidently, institutional reforms, corporate privatization and restructuring,
and macroeconomic stabilization in CECTs are far from being com-
pleted. If, e.g., firms lament that local banks refuse to fund risky though
potentially big-return projects, then governments should straight away27
liberalize capital markets. In essence, government failures bias the bal-
ance of costs and benefits of cross-border operations — and in most
cases the bias is negative as to CECTs.
In order to promote east-west corporate networks, governments can do
their best by shaping a sound regulatory framework supporting market
efficiency [Sadowska-Cieslack 1995]. Experience has shown that those
countries whose governments have striven for a liberal open-market
policy are often those that perform well in the global economy.
2 Insufficient Efforts in Developing Competitive Advantages
Liberal western economists consider decisions with regard to interna-
tionalization as a commercial matter for firms themselves. In principle,
markets provide enough incentives for making an optimal allocation of
resources and capabilities. However, eastern firms find it hard to under-
take the necessary steps to adjust their product range, technical capaci-
ties, sourcing and distribution facilities and organizational structures. As
Aghion, Blanchard and Burgess [1994] have shown, there is an in-
tertemporal problem in restructuring: it involves high costs in the first pe-
riod while gains can be expected, if at all, only in the period that follows.
This dilemma has considerably delayed deep corporate restructuring in
all CECTs [Carlin and Landesmann 1997]. Many firms in CECTs, for-
merly large combines or parts of them, still suffer from excess capacity,
overstaffing and inflexible organizational structures [Pellegrin 1997c].
They are anything but an ideal candidate for western firms in search of a
network partner.
There is some evidence that eastern managers tend to overstate their
resources and capabilities. In negotiations with potential western part-28
nersrthey often start with unrealistic expectations. Frequently, they can
offer no more than idle plants. They hope to quickly become "upgraded"
by a joint venture — but find themselves later "narrowed down"
[Sereghyova 1995]. Sometimes, it happens that western firms underes-
timate the potential of eastern counterparts which still suffer from the
negative image of the socialist past. However, their hesitant behaviour is
understandable: reputation is a vital pre-requisite to successful co-op-
eration in partnerships.
3 Existing Difficulties in Dealing with Different Corporate Cultures
Operating in a foreign country demands some country-specific knowl-
edge. This can be expected to be high if the cultural environment — in
this context the corporate culture, the organizational structure and the
management practice in the home and in the host country — is similar.
Although the geographic distance between western and central eastern
European countries is short — Germany and Austria on the one side and
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary on the other side are
neighbours — and although these countries are closely connected by
historical and cultural ties, after half a century of political division, differ-
ences between them appear to be greater than between western coun-
tries separated by a long distance. Kumar and Nti [1996] argued that
businessmen coming from an individualistic and a collectivistic culture
think very differently. In particular, they prefer different ways of dealing
with a conflict: while individualists emphasize competition and tend to
exacerbate the conflict, collectivists emphasize an accommodative strat-
egy which tends to avoid or to smooth it.29
Cultural discrepancies as a source of conflict are common. From the
large body of case studies, there is evidence that western managers
tend to promote a "strategic-active-deep restructuring" while their local
partners like to opt for a "defensive-reactive-shallow restructuring"
[Carlin and Landesmann 1997]. For promoting a joint venture, therefore,
western firms frequently find it necessary to delegate their own staff to
the partner's firms in order to reorganize activities there. Later though, if
things run as planned, they withdraw their managers and gradually re-
place them by local ones.
The impact of cultural discrepancies on firms' strategies is a crucial issue
which has been addressed in the literature in many ways. How manag-
ers transmit information, set targets, make decisions and deal with con-
flicts — all that is shaped by their cultural background. But congruence
in objectives and strategies is an important pre-requisite to successful
co-operation. Therefore, potential partners should find out in advance
whether their objectives and strategies are likely to be congruent or dif-
ferent. If they are different, co-operation will sooner or later fail.
V Turning Obstacles into Opportunities in East-West Network
Operations
The aim of our paper was to take stock of what has happened in the field
of east-west economic co-operation — and to see how this fits into the
new theoretical paradigms of inter-firm co-operation which frequently
stresses flexible contractual relationships between market transaction
and equity control. The books, articles and papers under consideration
show that these new forms are a powerful channel for linking eastern
firms into western corporate networks. The empirical evidence offers30
support to the hypothesis that the balance of costs and gains of network
co-operation is positive for them.
However, many an obstacle has yet to be removed before economies of
scope from economic integration can be fully exploited. Only a limited
number of eastern firms have already reached a technological and or-
ganizational standard that would make western firms regard them as
competent, reliable and trustworthy partners. As Bellak and Cantwell
[1997] point out, there is a "vicious development cycle": for eastern firms,
it is often difficult to enter a network and to climb up within it since they
would have to provide beforehand what they actually want to gain from
such a network.
Nevertheless, it makes no sense to lament about this. What is necessary
is to convert obstacles into opportunities. It is up to eastern firms and
governments to go ahead with this.
The crucial question is what can and what should governments do to
promote east-west network co-operation? Our appraisal has led us to
making the following recommendations:
• Correcting policy failure: market liberalization is the most important
factor to boost international business and trade. It opens market op-
portunities in domestic as well as in foreign markets. Liberalization
focuses on removing or reducing
• legal and procedural barriers,
• tariff- and non-tariff barriers to goods and capital flows,
• double taxation of profits,31
• exchange rate controls.
Governments which are reluctant to introduce general liberalization
can start with a limited and controlled experiment. They can estab-
lish special areas where enterprises are allowed to do their business
as they like. Results from border regions [Sander 1997; Schmidt
1997; Hamar 1997b] suggest that Free Economic Zones provide
enterprises with an ideal environment for cross-border operations.
Beyond liberalization, private industrial parks can offer services
which allow to overcome market imperfections.
Supporting public infrastructure: great value should be attached to
investing in public, and especially traffic, infrastructure. A modern
transport and communication network can effectively reduce trans-
portation costs which are natural barriers to trade. Moreover, east-
ern and western countries should develop efficient border crossing
facilities after these had been closed for several decades.
Overcoming information asymmetries: sophisticated sourcing of in-
formation and efficient communication are of vital importance for
eastern firms. High-tech communication by Internet, E-mail and
leased lines is still relatively poorly spread among them.
Thus, eastern firms frequently incur excessive costs for obtaining
information which is indispensable in international business, such as
information on actual market trends, potential customers, legal pro-
visions or regulations with respect to trade, taxes, foreign exchange
and foreign ownership. In principle, this kind of information is pro-
vided by commercial information services, thus available only on
charge. Governments can help to make it cheaper by promoting in-32
temational competition among private information services. The
business of private industrial parks, for instance, is largely based on
collecting and, respectively, selecting the information relevant to
foreign firms.
Building up firms' competence: A concern of government policy
should be increasing firms' international competence. These are
often not familiar with the business environment abroad. They can-
not easily cope with the attitudes of their foreign customers and in-
termediaries, and they have difficulties in understanding the foreign
legal and regulatory framework. Finally, they find it hard to over-
come the language barrier. In many instances, international compe-
tence can also be provided by private agents which have compara-
tive advantages in this respect and find it profitable to specialize ac-
cordingly.
Governments cannot directly eliminate the lack of competence.
However, as long as private agents do not enter the stage, they can
help firms to overcome their problems, e.g. by
• supporting business advisory services as provided by cham-
bers of commerce or so-called one-stop shops (collecting and
providing business information in one single place),
• initiating communication and collaboration activities among
firms for sharing marketing facilities or delivery services,
• promoting training initiatives to raise the level of sophistication
in using modern tools for international business,33
• enhancing capabilities for developing successful cross-cultural
relationships, e.g., foreign language initiatives and trainee
scholarship schemes.
Eliminating market failures in the banking sector, with respect to fi-
nance, governments should give a good deal of consideration to
design a regulatory framework which first is suitable to eliminate
market failures in the banking sector, and which second is condu-
cive to allowing private agents to remove market imperfections im-
peding firms' internationalization. It is true that eastern firms suffer
from a lack of financial resources. But next to market failure and
market imperfections, ill-designed rules — that is: government fail-
ure — may account for the largest part of their financial restrictions.
In general, governments in transformation economies should con-
sider
• privatizing and liberalizing the financial sector in a comprehen-
sive way, especially with respect to foreign banks,
• setting up a legal framework conducive to developing a private
venture capital market,
• taking a subsidiary role only if private solutions do not work out
within an acceptable time horizon or if market imperfections
produce too high an obstacle for firms to surmount.
In particular, governments should focus on
• promoting private risk sharing by offering tax incentives to
banks which participate in a private guarantee fund. Such tax
incentives can be differentiated by enterprise size.34
• •"*• promoting public-private risk sharing if a private guarantee fund
cannot be set up. A public body could take over the risk pre-
mium private banks charge from firms, such that these only
have to pay the "riskless" market rate,
• promoting activities of small foreign banks in their country.
Small foreign banks can be the ideal partner to small service or
manufacturing enterprises. An efficient instrument to promote
them may be setting up a guarantee fund which compensates
for the loss the small foreign bank may incur if firms fail. To en-
sure efficiency, however, it is crucial to charge a fee from banks
which want to get the guarantee. The fee makes the bank
weigh up if the credit risk is large enough to justify this expense
or if the risk is relatively small and the bank would be better off
bearing the risk on its own.
• offering public credits as long as either private or public-private
guarantee schemes do not yet work properly. It is important,
however, to offer public funds not as a gift but as an outright
credit for which a fee, even if below market-rates, should be
charged.
Beyond these specific measures, governments should take into ac-
count the close interconnections between real estate markets and
financial markets. In particular, they should remove all restrictions to
real estate ownership in order to encourage, on the one hand, the
establishment of both banks and enterprises and to allow, on the
other hand, real estate assets available to serve as one of the most
valuable guarantees enterprises can offer to banks. Notwithstanding
the role governments play in the face of large and long-lasting mar-35
ket imperfections, they have to be aware that each market acting of
public institutions is likely to crowd out private initiative. This may
narrow the scope for efficiency-enhancing inventions made by pri-
vate agents.36
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